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In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking
experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) — which are experienced as involuntary —
according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences
can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large
sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships
between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory
synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotis-
ability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expec-
tancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in
psychological experiments.
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Hypnotisability scales measure individual differences in theability to generate experience in response to imaginativesuggestion within a situation designated as hypnotic. Such
experiences include visual, auditory, or tactile hallucinations,
pain, amnesia, and apparently involuntary motor actions.
Response to hypnotic suggestion requires the ability to experience
a wide variety of imagined events as real1 and to experience a
sense of involuntariness over the response2. Such responding
therefore requires the top-down control of perception to meet
expectancies arising from imaginative suggestions3,4.
Hypnotic responding is distinct from social compliance or
social desirability, and is not attributable to mere compliance5,6.
Hypnotisability is a normally distributed and stable trait7. It has
long been known that response to imaginative suggestion does
not require hypnosis8. Indeed, hypnotic induction provides only a
small boost in response (around 10%) compared to imaginative
suggestion without induction9, and this boost appears to be
attributable to the word hypnosis10. Hypnosis can therefore be
considered a particular context in which people engage context-
general abilities to respond to imaginative suggestion (imagina-
tive suggestibility)11,12. In sum, response to imaginative sugges-
tion involves the top-down voluntary control of action and
experience (which is experienced as involuntary) according to a
stable trait ability, and hypnosis procedures are not necessary for
successful responding; hypnosis is just one context within which
imaginative suggestion effects occur13.
There is agreement among hypnosis researchers that response
to imaginative suggestion involves top-down control. For exam-
ple, in The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis14, all five chapters in
the section on theoretical perspectives involve control as a key
part of the theories described. So our position is not a minority
one; it is just accepting the current predominance of evidence and
approach in the field of imaginative and hypnotic suggestion (but
see Kirsch15 for the counter proposal that response to imaginative
suggestion is directly caused by expectancies). Because the term
‘imaginative suggestibility’ evokes unwarranted association with
other forms of suggestibility, we here refer to context-general top-
down effects on perception in response to imaginative suggestion
as ‘phenomenological control’. See Dienes et al.16 for detailed
discussion of the concept of phenomenological control in
response to imaginative suggestion.
Although hypnosis is not required for imaginative suggestion
effects, with a few notable exceptions17, scales which measure
response to imaginative suggestion have focused on the hyp-
notic context, in which suggestion is generally direct and
explicit. However, phenomenological control is not restricted to
response to direct suggestion. Indeed, hypnosis developed from
Mesmerism, an 18th century suggestion effect in which subjects
responded to implicit suggestion in a non-hypnotic context
with, for example, apparently involuntary convulsions18. There
is evidence that demand characteristics can drive experience in
scientific experiments19–23. Although this proposal is consistent
with many theoretical accounts of hypnosis and has potentially
wide-ranging implications16, it has not yet been directly
investigated.
In short, perceived task requirements may drive real experience
according to reliable trait differences in the ability to control
phenomenology to meet expectancies (phenomenological con-
trol). As an initial test of predictions arising from this theory, we
investigated mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion,
candidate effects commonly used to study embodiment which,
like hypnotic suggestion effects, involve striking and apparently
involuntary experiential change. These studies are intended as test
cases which, because of commonality with phenomenological
control effects, have the greatest likelihood of providing evidence
consistent with the theory.
In mirror-sensory synaesthesia, visual stimuli elicit reports of
tactile sensations (mirror touch synaesthesia)24,25 or pain
(vicarious pain perception or mirror pain)26. Around 2% of the
population may be mirror touch synaesthetes27. Grice-Jackson
et al.28 identify two groups of mirror pain responders: sensory
localisers (19%), who report a localised, sensory experience, and
affective general responders (12%), who report a generalised and
emotional vicarious pain experience. These effects have been
attributed to the activity of a mirror neuron system29, when
simulation of observed action in somatosensory mirroring sys-
tems overcomes a threshold of tactile awareness30. An alternative
theory proposes that vicarious experiences of observed stimula-
tion are creative forms of mental imagery which are ‘subinten-
tional’ (e.g., fidgeting or tapping along to music) rather than
intentional31; that is, they are not reflexive responses, but can
occur without conscious awareness of an intention.
In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), the subject’s hand is placed
out of view and brushed at the same time as a visible fake hand,
leading to subjective reports of experienced mis-location of the
participant’s hand and ownership over the rubber hand32. The
RHI is typically measured in two ways, agreement or disagree-
ment with illusion statements following brush stroke induction
(subjective report) and changes in perceived hand position before
and after induction (proprioceptive drift). The RHI is thought to
reflect the role of multimodal integration in the conscious
experience of ownership and location of one’s body and supports
an extensive literature on the sense of ownership. However,
opinions differ as to whether the illusion requires top-down
processes33 or whether multimodal integration alone is
sufficient34.
Typically, RHI researchers measure subjective reports follow-
ing both synchronous stimulation and a control condition of
asynchronous stimulation. Because asynchronous induction is
not expected to generate changes in experience, asynchronous
condition scores are interpreted as indicating suggestion or
compliance. Similarly, statements reflecting experiences which
experimenters do not expect (e.g., visual hallucination) are often
employed to control for suggestion and compliance. However,
because these statements consistently produce agreement in a
substantial proportion of participants, some researchers regard
them as valid illusion measures35. These control methods are
ineffective, as they overlook the role of expectancies in suggestion
effects, and therefore existing claims that reports of RHI experi-
ence are not suggestion effects are invalid36.
In sum, we find substantial relationships between trait hyp-
notisability and measures of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber
hand illusion, supporting predictions of the theory that demand
characteristics can drive experience and that these effects are
driven by the control of phenomenology to meet task expectan-
cies according to a stable trait ability.
Results
Study 1: mirror-sensory synaesthesia. We report correlational
analyses of mirror-sensory synaesthesia measures (response to
video stimuli, e.g., of touch or of apparently painful experience)
and subjective SWASH hypnotisability. If measures of mirror-
sensory synaesthesia reflect imaginative suggestion effects driven
by phenomenological control, response should correlate with
hypnotisability.
Mean subjective scale SWASH hypnotisability score (average
response to ten items/5) for the sample given the vicarious pain
questionnaire (VPQ; n= 404) was 1.7 (SD= 0.8). On the VPQ
itself, the mean total pain response (0–14) was 3.9 (SD= 3.8) and
mean pain intensity (0–10) was 1.0 (SD= 1.3). Mean subjective
scale SWASH score for the mirror touch synaesthesia (MTS; n=
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154) sample was 1.7 (SD= 0.8). In this sample, mean touch to
human responses was 1.5 (SD= 2.9) and touch to object
responses was 0.2 (SD= 0.7).
Hypnotisability predicted VPQ total pain response (Fig. 1a), b
= 1.25 responses/unit SWASH (SE= 0.23), t(402) = 5.55, p <
0.001, 95% CI [0.8, 1.7], R2= 0.071, BH(0,1.1) = 5.72 × 105, RR=
[0.047, 435] and the intensity (1–10) of vicarious pain (Fig. 1b), b
= 0.46, intensity/unit SWASH (SE= 0.08), t(402) = 6.00, p <
0.001, 95% CI [0.31, 0.62], R2= 0.082, BH(0,0.3) = 2.60 × 106, RR
= [0.016, 163]. Regression analysis of mirror touch scores showed
that hypnotisability predicted mean number of responses (out of
14) when observing touch to a human (Fig. 2a), b= 0.83
responses/unit SWASH (SE= 0.27), t(152) = 3.07, p= 0.003,
95% CI [0.30, 1.37], R2= 0.058, BH(0,0.5) = 11.98, RR= [0.011,
2.02] and number of responses (out of 6) for touch to an
inanimate object (Fig. 2b), b= 0.18, responses/unit SWASH (SE
= 0.07), t(152) = 2.55, p= 0.012, 95% CI [0.04, 0.32], R2= 0.041,
BH(0,0.07) = 5.23, RR= [0.004, 0.12].
Study 2: The rubber hand illusion. Separate groups of partici-
pants completed a RHI procedure after being informed either that
they should expect the illusion for synchronous induction (n=
114) or that they should expect the illusion for asynchronous
induction (n= 115). A third control group was not given infor-
mation about what to expect (n= 124). We report analyses in two
sections: pre-registered analyses (intended to test the effect of
experimentally manipulated expectancies on RHI measures) and
non-registered analyses. Non-registered correlational analyses
were chosen to reflect the most commonly reported measures of
the RHI and the simplest predictions of the theory that the RHI is
at least partially driven by phenomenological control.
Mean subjective scale SWASH hypnotisability score (0–5) was
1.6 (SD= 0.7) in the control group, 1.6 (SD= 0.8) for
synchronous instruction and 1.7 (SD= 0.7) for asynchronous
instruction.
Our pre-registered analyses included a test of whether changes
in expectancies affected RHI measures. In order to test the effects
of manipulating expectancies on RHI measures, we first had to
check that we had successfully manipulated expectancies. Mean
expectancies for synchronous induction were 0.9 (SD= 1.1) for
the synchronous instruction group, 0.9 (SD= 1.1) for the
asynchronous induction group and 0.7 (SD= 1.1) for the control
group. Mean expectancies for asynchronous induction were −0.1
(SD= 1.2) for the synchronous instruction group, 0.2 (SD= 1.3)
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Fig. 1 Scatter plots showing linear regression of vicarious pain measures (n = 404 participants) on hypnotisability. a Total pain responses on
hypnotisability, Spearman’s rs = 0.26, 95% CI [0.17, 0.35]. b Pain intensity on hypnotisability, Spearman’s rs = 0.27, 95% CI [0.18, 0.36]. Error bars show
95% CI.The centre of credibility intervals is the predicted score. Note: SWASH is an abbreviation of Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability.
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Fig. 2 Scatter plots showing linear regression of mirror touch measures on hypnotisability (n = 154 participants). a Touch to human responses,
Spearman’s rs = 0.19, 95% CI [0.04, 0.34]. b Touch to object responses, Spearman’s rs = 0.21, 95% CI [0.06, 0.36]. Error bars show 95% CI. The centre
of credibility intervals is the predicted score. Note: SWASH is an abbreviation of Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotisability.
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for the asynchronous induction group and −0.6 (SD= 1.2) for
the control group. There was no sensitive evidence for whether or
not the interaction of instruction (synchronous or asynchronous)
and induction condition (synchronous or asynchronous) was
greater than zero on expectancies, F(1,255) = 2.06, p= 0.153, η2p
= 0.009, BH(0,1.2) = 0.72. Therefore, our experimental manipula-
tion of expectancy was not shown to be effective and pre-
registered analyses based on differences between the suggested
synchronous and suggested asynchronous conditions could not
be conducted.
We next tested the pre-registered key test that control group
RHI response was lower for asynchronous induction than
synchronous induction (a typical control in RHI studies).
Subjective report was recorded on a 7 point scale from −3 to
+3, with −3 indicating strong disagreement and +3 strong
agreement with a given statement. Proprioceptive drift was given
by the distance in cm between pre- and post-induction reports of
hand location. For controls, proprioceptive drift was greater
following synchronous induction (M= 0.93 cm, SD= 2.64) than
asynchronous induction (M= 0.38 cm, SD= 2.25), t(123) = 2.18,
p= 0.031, 95% CI [0.1, 1.1], d= 0.20, BH(0,1) = 4.51, RR= [0.17,
1.68]. Subjective report (S1-3) was higher for synchronous
induction (M= 0.9, SD= 1.6) than asynchronous induction (M
=−0.7, SD= 1.7), t(123) = 9.89, p < 0.001, 95% CI [1.3, 1.9], d
= 0.89, BH(0,1) = 8.67 × 1020, RR= [0.02, 62]. Therefore,
according to a typical control procedure, the RHI was successfully
induced in the control group.
Finally, we conducted pre-registered tests of relationships
between RHI difference scores (synchronous induction minus
asynchronous induction) and hypnotisability. There was only
anecdotal evidence for the difference in proprioceptive drift score
between induction conditions being related to hypnotisability in
the control group, b= 0.64 cm drift/unit SWASH (SE= 0.36), t
(122) = 1.80, p (one-tailed) = 0.037, 95% CI [−0.06, 1.34], R2=
0.026, BH(0,0.4) = 2.91, RR= [0.4, 0.8]. There was no sensitive
evidence for or against a relationship between hypnotisability and
the difference in mean subjective rating (S1–S3) between
induction conditions in the control condition, b=−0.002
rating/unit SWASH (SE= 0.23), t(122) = 0.011, p (one tailed)
= 0.496, 95% CI [−0.46, 0.46], R2= 0.00, BH(0,0.3) = 0.61, RR=
[0, 0.75].
There was no evidence that the experimental manipulation
caused expectancies to change in the predicted direction.
Therefore, we were unable to manipulate participant expectancies
as planned. We can only speculate as to why participants told to
expect experience of the illusion for asynchronous induction did
not believe the information they were given. Participants may
already have had knowledge of the RHI, or there may be strong
expectancies inherent in the task (e.g., synchrony of visual and
tactile stimuli is common in experience of one’s own hand).
Additionally, our explanation of why participants should expect a
greater effect when stimuli were asynchronous may have been
unconvincing and simply not believed by participants. Conse-
quently, we are unable to directly establish a causal role for
phenomenological control in the RHI. However, we collected RHI
and hypnotisability measures from 353 participants across groups
and correlational evidence for substantial relationships between
the RHI and hypnotisability in this unusually large sample would,
considered alongside the correlational evidence reported here for
mirror-sensory synesthesia, carry important implications for
interpretations of the RHI. Furthermore, we have a measure of
expectancies in the RHI illusion. Evidence that expectancies
predict RHI measures would provide evidence which could not be
easily explained by multimodal integration theories but which
would be consistent with the theory that top-down processes are
required, and that phenomenological control drives RHI
measures. As there was no evidence the expectancy manipulation
worked, we henceforth analyse data collapsing across the
manipulation (see Supplementary Table 1 for analyses of each
condition which were entered into Bayesian meta-analysis to
calculate statistics for collapsed conditions).
In our pre-registered analysis, we found no evidence for or
against a relationship between an RHI agreement score difference
measure (synchronous minus asynchronous induction). How-
ever, difference measures are rarely used in RHI research. Rather,
asynchronous condition measures are typically used only in a
prior check that suggestion and compliance effects have been
controlled. That is, statistical evidence that synchronous condi-
tion measures are greater than asynchronous induction measures
is used to justify the interpretation of synchronous induction
measures as reflecting illusion response. We reviewed the twenty
most highly cited RHI papers. 100% of subjective report measures
and 65% of proprioceptive drift measures were reported in this
way rather than using a measure of the difference between
conditions as the measure of interest (see Supplementary
Discussion for details). Therefore, our pre-registered measures
were not well motivated by the literature. We therefore conduct
simple correlational analyses of the measures most commonly
reported in RHI research. That is, measures following synchro-
nous induction (following a control test that asynchronous
induction measures are lower than synchronous condition
measures, as reported in our pre-registered analysis). While not
pre-registered, these analyses are constrained by closely adhering
to the most common procedures in RHI research and are
necessary to support direct comparison with, and therefore
inform interpretation of, the bulk of existing RHI literature.
Evidence that hypnotisability scores predict the most common
RHI measures would be consistent with the theory that the RHI,
as commonly reported, is at least partially driven by phenom-
enological control. Hypnotisability predicted synchronous induc-
tion subjective report of ownership and location (S1–S3; Fig. 3a),
b= 0.57 rating/unit SWASH (SE= 0.10), t(347) = 5.86, p < 0.001,
95% CI [0.37, 0.77], R2= 0.09, BH(0,1.4) = 1.49 × 106, RR= [0.02,
201.70] of visual hallucinations (S4; Fig. 3b), b= 0.83 rating/unit
SWASH (SE= 0.13), t(347) = 6.56, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.57, 1.09],
R2= 0.11, BH(0,1.4) = 1.10 × 108, RR= [0.023, 302.3] and of
proprioceptive drift (Fig. 3c) b= 0.58 cm drift/unit SWASH
(SE= 0.21), t(347) = 2.65, p= 0.008, 95% CI [0.17, 0.98], R2=
0.02, BH(0,0.3) = 14.66, RR= [0.10, 6.30].
Asynchronous induction measures are generally assumed to
represent suggestion effects in RHI studies. If asynchronous
measures are predicted by hypnotisability, this assumption would
be supported. Hypnotisability also predicted asynchronous
induction subjective report of ownership and location (S1–S3),
b= 0.70 rating/unit SWASH (SE= 0.11), t(347) = 5.86, p < 0.001,
95% CI [0.48, 0.91], R2= 0.09, BH(0,1.4) = 4.30 × 107, RR= [0.03,
251.89] and visual hallucinations, b= 0.87 rating/unit SWASH
(SE= 0.12), t(347) = 6.87, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.63, 1.11], R2=
0.12, BH(0,1.4) = 1.83 × 1010, RR= [0.03, 321.81]. However, there
was no evidence for or against a relationship between
asynchronous induction proprioceptive drift and hypnotisability
(Fig. 3c) b= 0.02 cm drift/unit SWASH (SE= 0.25), t(347) =
1.03, p= 0.306, 95% CI [−0.48, 0.52], R2= 0.003, BH(0,0.3) = 0.67,
RR= [0, 0.80].
Imaginative suggestion effects are driven by expectancies.
Evidence that participant expectancies predict synchronous
induction RHI measures would be consistent with the theory
that the RHI as most commonly reported is attributable to
phenomenological control. Expectancy rating (−3 to +3) for
illusion experience in synchronous induction predicted subjective
report for the synchronous induction (Fig. 3d), b= 0.33 rating/
unit expectancy (SE= 0.07), t(347) = 4.71, p < 0.001, 95% CI
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[0.20, 0.47], R2= 0.06, BH(0,0.4) = 1.66 × 104, RR= [0.017, 107.9].
There was no evidence for or against an effect of expectancy for
the synchronous induction on synchronous induction proprio-
ceptive drift, b= 0.09 rating/unit expectancy (SE= 0.14), t(347)
= 0.60, p= 0.551, 95% CI= [−0.19, 0.37], R2= 0.001, BH(0,0.65)
= 0.38, RR= [0, 0.8].
Discussion
We report evidence consistent with the theory that key measures
in the field of embodiment are, at least partially, driven by phe-
nomenological control. Measures of mirror-sensory synaesthesia
and the rubber hand illusion were predicted by the ability to
control phenomenology in a hypnotic context. The correlations
were similar to those between individual hypnosis scale items and
hypnotisability scales37. Therefore, while the evidence presented
here is correlational, a simple explanation is that hypnotic
responding and measures of these embodiment phenomena both
reflect trait differences in the ability to control phenomenology
according to expectancies. These embodiment effects may or may
not be entirely attributable to demand characteristics and phe-
nomenological control. Existing approaches to control for sug-
gestion effects in these measures are not effective, and
interpretation of RHI and mirror-sensory synaesthesia measures
requires consideration of trait differences in the ability to control
experience to meet expectancies. In sum, because phenomen-
ological control abilities are engaged within a range of contexts
and in response to indirect or implicit suggestion, measures of
experiential change in psychological studies may reflect top-down
control of perception instead of, or in addition to other posited
mechanisms.
Hypnotisability scores substantially predicted measures of
mirror touch and pain. Further work will be required to identify
the relative influence of expectancies, phenomenological control
abilities and other mechanisms in mirror-sensory synaesthesia.
For example, is mirror touch a less common experience than
mirror pain because fewer people expect to experience it, because
it is easier to generate experience of pain than of touch, or
because of other mechanisms not related to phenomenological
control? Mirror touch and pain experience also occurs outside the
laboratory. Phenomenological control is sensitive to plans and
goals38,39, and it is a long-standing adage amongst hypnosis
researchers that all hypnosis can be seen as self-hypnosis (e.g.
Kilhstrom40, pp 217–218). Therefore, people may implement
phenomenological control in everyday life when it suits their
plans and goals; namely when they have an interest in having a
certain subjective experience; for example, in the case of vicarious
pain the goal of being an empathic person. Notably, experiences
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Fig. 3 Scatter plots showing linear regression (n= 353 participants) of synchronous condition rubber hand illusion measures on hypnotisability and
expectancies. a Mean subjective report for location and ownership (S1–S3) on hypnotisability, rs= 0.26, 95% CI [0.16, 0.37]. b Proprioceptive drift on
hypnotisability, rs= 0.11, 95% CI [0.003, 0.22], (c) subjective report for visual hallucination (S4) on hypnotisability, rs= 0.31, 95% CI [0.21, 0.43], and (d)
synchronous condition mean subjective report for location and ownership (S1–S3) on synchronous condition expectancy. rs= 0.23, 95% CI [0.13, 0.34].
Error bars show 95% CI. The centre of credibility intervals is the predicted score. Note: SWASH is an abbreviation of Sussex-Waterloo Scale of
Hypnotisability.
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of touch and pain are common hypnotic suggestion effects: pain
modulation is perhaps the most studied of all imaginative sug-
gestion effects41 and felt touch is a component of the most
influential hypnotisability measurement scales (and their deriva-
tives), in the form of a suggestion that an insect has landed upon
the subject’s hand42,43.
Subjective report of ownership, location and visual hallucina-
tion following both synchronous and asynchronous induction
were substantially predicted by hypnotisability. Consistent with
evidence that RHI control measures are confounded by demand
characteristics, Lush36 found that the expectancies of naive par-
ticipants only described and not given the RHI procedure mat-
ched the classic pattern of illusion experience (that is, illusion
experience following synchronous but not asynchronous induc-
tion). That is, differences in report between illusion and control
conditions may simply be attributable to differing expectancies
and response difficulties of suggestion effects, and future RHI
studies must ensure that expectancies and difficulty are closely
matched across all control and illusion conditions to support
claims that suggestion effects have been controlled. Existing evi-
dence that expectation is sufficient to generate the RHI44,45
(contrast Guterstam)56 is parsimoniously explained if the RHI is
an implicit imaginative suggestion effect.
Proprioceptive drift was predicted by hypnotisability for syn-
chronous induction. Relationships between hypnotisability and
synchronous induction measures were considerable for both
subjective report and drift; for each 1 point increase in SWASH
score (out of a maximum of 5) subjective report (S1–S3)
increased by approximately half a point (7 point scale) and
proprioceptive drift increased by approximately 0.5 cm. Two
studies have explicitly related operational definitions of imagi-
native suggestion to the rubber hand illusion. Walsh et al.46
reported a positive correlation between hypnotisability and pro-
prioceptive drift. While noting that synchronous stimulation
presented a strong implicit suggestion, they argued against a role
for suggestion in drift on the basis of a non-significant correlation
between subjective report and hypnotisability (though the direc-
tion of the reported effect is consistent with a relationship).
Conversely, Marotta et al.47 report a correlation between sensory
suggestibility (a measure which has been shown to be related to
hypnotisability48,49; contrast Tasso & Perez50) and the RHI. Here
a non-significant correlation was used to argue that propriocep-
tive drift is not related to suggestion. Non-significant results do
not constitute evidence for the null hypothesis51 and these studies
do not, therefore, provide evidence against relationships between
RHI measures and hypnotisability.
These results are consistent with a cognitive account of the
RHI, in which reports of illusory experience reflect acts of ima-
gination52 and with arguments that trait differences in the ability
to respond to the rubber hand illusion are not attributable to
multimodal sensory integration alone, but that top-down pro-
cesses are required35. Walsh et al.46 report a correlation of 0.55
between a drift difference measure and subjective hypnotisability.
Consistent with evidence that proprioceptive drift is at least partly
driven by top-down processes33,53, Bayesian combination of our
data and this prior result provides evidence that even when
measured in this way, proprioceptive drift is related to hypno-
tisability (r= 0.22 (SE = 0.08). 95% CI [0.05, 0.38] BH(0,0.3) =
13.86).
Previous findings can be reconstrued in terms of phenomen-
ological control in the rubber hand illusion. For example, effects
can occur in unimodal stimulation54–56; for mere expectations of
touch;44 or without a fake hand (e.g., the illusion can occur for
drawings of hands57, or empty space58). As in response to ima-
ginative suggestions presented during hypnotisability screening,
there are large individual differences in response to the illusion:
while some participants report powerful changes in experience,
around 25% are apparently unable to experience the illusion at
all59,60. Like response to imaginative suggestion, individual dif-
ferences in response to the RHI reflect an underlying trait35. Here,
we propose that this trait is the same as that measured by hyp-
notisability scales.
There is existing evidence that responses to mirror-sensory
synaesthesia and response to the RHI are related. Mirror touch
synaesthetes experience the rubber hand illusion61 and the closely
related enfacement illusion62 in the absence of synchronous
tactile signals. Similarly, mirror pain responders also report
experiences of ownership over rubber hands following both
synchronous and asynchronous stimulation63 and show stronger
effects in the rubber hand illusion than non-responders64. A
simple explanation is that these effects each reflect underlying
trait differences in the ability to control phenomenology to meet
expectancies, as measured by hypnotisability scales.
If phenomenological control produced effects in embodiment
experiments, the resulting reports of experiences would be gen-
uine. There is plentiful evidence that response to imaginative
suggestion within a hypnotic context involves genuine changes in
experience, and this is not considered an open question by
hypnosis researchers65. For example, the behaviour of high
hypnotisables and lows attempting to simulate their behaviour is
distinct5,66, and hypnotic suggestion can result in apparently
painless surgery67. However, response to imaginative suggestion
is an interpretative and creative activity and subjective report
measures may reflect a wide variety of experiences. For example,
participants give varied responses to multiple choice questions
about mirror-sensory synaesthesia30, and the statement used to
measure experiences of ownership over the rubber hand is open
to a wide range of interpretations68. If reports reflect phenom-
enological control, the only constraint on experience is that it
meets individual, interpretative expectancies, and quantitative
measures of mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand
illusion are likely to conceal great variety in experience. To the
degree to which measures of embodiment effects are driven by
phenomenological control, they cannot provide a solid founda-
tion for theories about embodiment (e.g., mirror neurons or the
sense of ownership).
The evidence presented here is based on self-report measures,
but there are established indirect measures of these effects. For
example, the RHI has been reported to incur physiological effects
such as changes skin conductance response69 or histamine reac-
tivity70. These measures are also likely to reflect phenomen-
ological control; hypnotic suggestion can induce changes in skin
conductance response71 and histamine reactivity72. Brain imaging
shows activity in areas considered to be important for body
ownership experiences in the rubber hand illusion73 and in
mirror-sensory synaesthesia30. However, because imaginative
suggestion also produces such changes (e.g., visual cortex activity
for visual hallucinations74 suggested pain shows similar patterns
of activation to physically induced pain64), brain imaging data are
also not evidence against suggestion effects.
While the effects reported here are related to embodiment and
involve tactile hallucinations, there is no reason to expect that
such relationships will be limited to such cases. An RHI control
statement about changes in visual features of the hand (S4) was
here predicted by hypnotisability and may be an example of
demand characteristic driven subjective report compatible with a
visual hallucination. Furthermore, the hypnotisability scale with
which reports of mirror touch and pain correlate here contains
ten suggestions, and only one of these (a suggestion that a
mosquito can be felt on the participant’s hand) involves tactile
experience. Imaginative suggestion effects are not limited to
somatosensory experience, and potentially any experience which
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can be generated in response to imaginative suggestion in a
hypnotic context could be generated to meet expectancies arising
from demand characteristics (for a review of hypnotic suggestion
effects, see Woody and Barnier75; for a review of top-down effects
in imaginative recent suggestion, see Terhune et al.4).
While we report correlational evidence that trait hypnotis-
ability (phenomenological control in the hypnotic context) pre-
dicts embodiment measures, we do not directly provide evidence
for anything beyond these relationships. However, our inferences
draw upon a vast literature investigating trait hypnotisability and
response to imaginative suggestion and the proposal that these
correlations indicate that response to the rubber hand illusion
and mirror-sensory synaesthesia at least partially is a parsimo-
nious theory (simple because it posits one mechanism to explain a
wide range of phenomena) which cannot currently be ruled out.
Experiments which measure behaviour linked to relatively high-
level cognitive processes may be susceptible to the generation of
experience in response to demand characteristics; for example,
experimental paradigms in embodiment research closely related
to the rubber hand illusion (e.g., the full body illusion). Similarly,
given the classical suggestion effect of the experience of invo-
luntariness, we should expect to find a relationship between
reports of changes in the sense of agency76 and phenomenological
control. Indeed, mirror-touch synaesthetes are particularly vul-
nerable to manipulations of the experience of agency77. However,
it cannot be ruled out that there may even be some phenomen-
ological control effects in apparently low level tasks, if those tasks
are not as free of top-down influence (for example, if demand
characteristics have not been well controlled) as has been
assumed78,79. These intriguing empirical questions remain open.
The concept of demand characteristics (unconscious changes
in behaviour to meet implied experimental aims) as developed by
Orne80 is often used to refer to behavioural compliance effects
specifically. However, Orne considered demand characteristics
not to be limited to shifts in behaviour but to potentially include
genuine changes in phenomenology in a substantial subset of the
population. That experimental demand characteristics can act as
implicit imaginative suggestions to generate changes in phe-
nomenology has been overlooked. This study motivates a sys-
tematic exploration of the influence of phenomenological control
across a wide range of experimental contexts in which subjective
phenomenological reports are prominent.
The contextually driven control of phenomenology in accor-
dance with expectations has been a topic of psychological study
since the birth of the discipline. Unfortunately, this has been
primarily restricted to the hypnotic context, with the result that
this fundamental aspect of human psychology has not been seen
as relevant to other areas of psychology. We argue that it is now
necessary to look beyond the hypnotic context to explore phe-
nomenological control in wider contexts, both to avoid acciden-
tally engaging this ability when measuring other target
phenomena and as an empirical target in its own right.
Methods
Participants. For study 1, we combined databases of participants screened for
vicarious pain on the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire or VPQ (n= 1056, age 18–60
years, M= 20.42, SD= 4.16, 759 females, 297 males; reported in Botan et al.81;
Grice-Jackson et al.28) and for mirror touch synaesthesia or MTS (n= 283, age=
18–52 years, M= 21.3 years SD= 4.5, 237 females, 46 males; reported in Ward
et al.82) with a database of participants screened for hypnotisability using the
SWASH at Sussex University. For vicarious pain, 404 participant’s scores were
matched and for mirror touch synaesthesia, 154 were matched.
For study 2, an opportunity sample of 385 participants took part in a hypnosis
screening procedure during an undergraduate Psychology laboratory practical
session. 32 participants either declined to take part in a second rubber hand illusion
session or were unable to upload hypnosis data due to a server error. Therefore, we
recorded data for 353 participants across both procedures. Participants were
assigned to one of three conditions according to which of three instructions would
be delivered by headphones. 114 participants (85 female, 29 male; mean age = 19.0,
SD= 1.6) were informed that the effect would be strongest in synchronous
stroking (synchrony instruction condition, though note this was not worded as a
hypnotic suggestion but as information), 115 (92 female, 21 Male; mean age = 19.0,
SD= 1.4) were informed that the effect would be strongest in asynchronous
stroking (asynchrony instruction condition) and 115 received no instructions
(control condition). Nine participants who received no instructions (either because
they removed their headphones before delivery or due to computer error) were
added to the control group, so there were 124 (99 female, 25 male, mean age =
18.9, SD= 1.1) participants analysed for the control group. These participants were
retained because we stated in our pre-registration document (available from
https://osf.io/xf6u4/) that we would use all available data. However, no statistical
inferences differ between the control group with or without the additional
participants. Participants were screened for hypnotisability on the computer
SWASH83. Approval was received from the University of Sussex ethics committee
and participants gave informed consent for the study.
Materials. For study 1, hypnotisability was measured using the Sussex-Waterloo
scale of hypnotisability (SWASH)37, a 10 item adaptation of the Waterloo-Stanford
scale (WSGC)84. SWASH scores are measured on a dichotomous objective scale
and a subjective scale of between 0 and 5 for each item37.
For full details of the procedure used to measure vicarious or mirror-pain, see
Grice-Jackson et al.28. Participants watched 16 short video clips of people
experiencing physical pain (e.g. falls, sports injuries, injections). After each video,
participants responded to questions by computer. First they were asked if they
experienced a bodily sensation of pain while viewing the video. If they answered
yes, they were then asked to describe their pain by answering three further
questions: (1) how intense their pain experience was (on a Likert scale from 1–10);
(2) if pain was either “localised to the same point as the observed pain in the
video”, “localised but not to the same point”, or “a general/non-localisable
experience of pain”; (3) to select pain adjectives from a list that best described their
vicarious pain experience (10 sensory descriptors, 10 affective descriptors and 3
cognitive-evaluative descriptors).
For full details of the procedure used to measure mirror touch synaesthesia, see
Ward et al.82. Participants watched short video clips85, including depictions of
touch to a human (14 videos), touch to inanimate objects (dummies and a fan; 6
videos) and painful stimuli (e.g., injections; 6 videos). After each video, participants
responded to questions by computer. First they were asked if they experienced
anything on their body (excluding feelings of unease, disgust, or flinching). If they
answered yes, they were asked three further questions: (1) Whether they would
describe the sensation as Touch (without pain); Pain (without touch); Painful
touch; Tingling; Itchiness; Feeling of being scratched; or Other. (2) Where on their
body the sensation was felt (from a list of options). Finally, they were asked how
intense the sensation was (on a Likert scale from 1–10).
For study 2, participants were screened for hypnotisability by computer.
SWASH scores are numerically similar to in-person delivery whether delivered in a
lab setting (PL, RBS, ZD in preparation) or delivered online83. SWASH computer
induction is identical to the live delivery described in Lush et al.37 except
participants receive a recorded induction via headphones and responses are
recorded using a computer keyboard rather than a paper form. Two changes are
made to the stimuli and report procedure; a slide of 3 coloured balls is displayed on
a computer screen rather than a lecture hall screen and the post-hypnotic
suggestion changed from drawing a tree to pressing the keyboard space bar
six times.
Printed materials (e.g., response sheets) and instruction scripts for study 2 are
available at https://osf.io/huwxd/. The setup was based on experimental materials
described in Botan et al.63. Participants sat at a table opposite the experimenter and
placed their right hand in a black-fabric covered box (61 × 46 × 23 cm3). A realistic
model hand was placed in the box so that it was in front of the participant’s torso.
Participants were asked to rest their right hand in a similar position to the rubber
hand, with their index finger on a white dot positioned 20 cm lateral to the index
finger of the fake hand. Participants were unable to see their own hand inside the
box and could only view the fake hand through a square window in the top surface
of the box.
There were five copies of the experimental setup, which were used
simultaneously. In total, sixteen experimenters performed the experiment across
eleven one hour sessions. Experimenters were blind to the instruction condition for
each participant.
Before the experiment began, participants received pre-recorded information
about the experiment via headphones. All participants were told that told that they
were going to take part in a rubber hand illusion study and that this was a separate
study to the hypnotisability screening procedure. Participants were pseudo-
randomly assigned by a computer program to one of three groups. Participants in
instruction groups were told that the illusion would be strongest in either the
synchronous or asynchronous induction. Participants in the synchronous
condition were told that illusion would be strongest when the felt and seen brush
strokes occurred simultaneously because the relative timing of visual and tactile
information influences whether or not the information is perceived as arising from
a common source. Participants in the asynchronous condition were told that the
illusion would be strongest when the felt brush stroke followed the seen brush
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stroke because of neural delays involved in integrating visual and tactile stimuli and
that “researchers have found a 1/3 of a second to be the optimal delay, which we
will approximately reproduce here in order to generate the maximum effect”. The
control group received no further information. See Supplemental Method for
instruction condition scripts.
Participants recorded their participant number and their response to two
expectancy questions on a response sheet (Table 1). Response sheets were folded
after each response was recorded to prevent participants seeing their previous
responses. The experimenter then recorded which of the two conditions
(synchronous or asynchronous induction) was performed first (this order was
alternated by participant). Pre-test and post-test proprioceptive drift were recorded
immediately before and immediately following induction. First, the viewing
window was then covered and a 60 cm ruler placed on the top of the box, with the
numbers facing the experimenter. To prevent participants repeating responses for
each measurement, the ruler was positioned so that the end was over the edge of
the box by a variable distance, which was subtracted from the participant’s report.
Participants were told that the ruler would change position each time and that they
should not try to report the same number repeatedly as it would not refer to the
same position. They were then asked to point to the position at which they thought
the index finger of their right hand was located and this was recorded to the nearest
half cm. The cover was then removed and the participant was told to keep their
gaze on the rubber hand and to focus on it. A paintbrush was then used to stroke
the middle finger of the rubber hand at approximately 1 Hz while simultaneously
stroking the middle finger of the participantʼs real hand with an identical brush
either synchronously or with an asynchrony of approximately 0.5 Hz. Brush strokes
were applied from the knuckle to the finger nail of the real and fake hands. This
induction procedure continued for 60 s, following which participants were asked to
keep their hand still and inside the box and the hole was covered. Participants were
again asked to report the position of their real hand and then reported their level of
agreement with statements S1–S4 on the response sheet (Table 1). The procedure
was then repeated in the other condition (synchronous or asynchronous
induction).
Measures. For study 1 we report analyses of the primary VPQ measure used to
identify vicarious pain perceivers28: total pain response (the number of videos from
0 to 16 for which a bodily sensation of pain was reported and also the intensity of
pain. For Mirror touch synaesthesia we report the mean number of reports of
experience when observing touch to a human (0–14) and the mean number of
responses when observing touch to an inanimate object (0–6).
For pre-registration of planned measures and planned analyses for study 2, see:
https://osf.io/xf6u4/. Participants recorded responses on a 7 point Likert scale
(Table 1). Subjective response for each participant was calculated from the average
of S1–S3 and, separately, the score for S4. Proprioceptive drift was calculated by
subtracting post induction stroking from pre induction stroking for each induction
condition. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting synchronous condition
measures from asynchronous condition measures. Subjective scale SWASH scores
were used as a measure of hypnotisability due to greater reliability than the
objective scale37.
For whole sample exploration, participants from all three groups were
combined in a Bayesian fixed-effects meta-analysis. Exploratory analyses were
conducted on subjective report and proprioceptive drift following synchronous
induction.
Analyses. For study 1, Bayes factors for raw slopes of VPQ and MTS measures
regressed onto subjective SWASH score were modelled on the expected change in y
(given by mean score on the VPQ measure across the whole sample) and the
expected difference in SWASH score between 0 and the 50th percentile of the
sample (a SWASH score of 1.7) as the change in x. The maximum slope was
therefore calculated in each case using the mean to bottom of scale for Y over the
distance from mean to bottom of scale for X (the ratio-of-means heuristic
described in Dienes)86. For VPQ measures, H1 was therefore modelled using half
the maximum slopes of 3.9 over 1.7 (1.1) for total pain response and 1.0 over 1.7
for pain intensity (or 0.3) For MTS measures, H1 was modelled using half the
maximum slopes of 1.5 over 1.7 (or 0.5) touch to a human and a maximum slope of
0.2 over 1.7 (or 0.07) for touch to an inanimate object.
To indicate the robustness of Bayesian conclusions, for each B, a robustness
region is reported, giving the range of scales that qualitatively support a given
conclusion (i.e. evidence as insensitive, or as supporting H0, or as supporting H1),
notated as: RR [x1, x2] where x1 is the smallest SD that supports the conclusion
and x2 is the largest.
Pre-registered analyses for Study 2 were not performed that were dependent
upon the results of manipulation checks (outcome neutral tests) that in fact did not
provide evidence that the manipulation worked. A first manipulation check tested
the prediction that, given no explicit instructions, any difference in dependent
variables in the control group would be due to a difference in expectations. For this,
we tested the interaction of instruction condition (synchronous or asynchronous
instructions) by rubber hand induction type (synchronous vs asynchronous) on
expectancies. A Bayes factor was calculated using the difference in expectancy
ratings between conditions (synchronous—asynchronous) in the control group to
model the SD of a half-normal distribution with a mean of 0.
Further manipulation checks tested the prediction that in the control group,
rubber hand illusion measures should be greater for synchronous than
asynchronous induction. Bayes factors of t-tests for these differences were
calculated using a model of H1 based on the reported difference in Botan et al.63,
across all groups (weighted by sample size); for proprioceptive drift, a difference of
approximately 10 mm between synchronous and asynchronous condition and for
subjective report, a difference in agreement score) of approximately 1 unit (7 point
scale).
For Study 2 pre-registered key tests, we tested the prediction that the control
group difference in illusion measures between synchronous and asynchronous
inductions would be positively related to hypnotisability scores by regressing the
effect of induction condition (synchronous—asynchronous) on illusion measures
on SWASH hypnotisability rating. Raw regression slopes were tested by Bayes
factors with H1s modelled on the effect size for the rubber hand illusion reported in
Botan et al.63 as the expected change in y and the expected difference in SWASH
score between 0 and the 50th percentile as the expected change in x (cf. ratio-of-
means heuristic recommended by Dienes)86. However, for consistency with the rest
of the manuscript, here we calculated Bayes factors using this expected slope as a
plausible maximum. In each case the predicted value for the pre-registered analysis
was contained within the robustness region for the presented analysis, so this
change makes no difference to inferences. The maximum slope for proprioceptive
drift was therefore 13 mm over 1.6 (the difference in SWASH score between the 0
and the 50th percentile), or approximately 8 mm for each 1 point increase (out of
5) in SWASH subjective score, so H1 was modelled with an SD of 4 mm. The
maximum slope for subjective report was calculated as 1 over 1.6, or 0.6 units per 1
point increase in SWASH subjective score, so H1 was modelled with a mean of 0
and an SD of 0.3. These a priori estimates appear plausible according to the
correlation between proprioceptive drift and hypnotisability reported in Walsh
et al.46 and the correlation between subjective report and sensory suggestibility
reported in Marotta et al.47.
For study 2 exploratory analyses, first we report regression analyses of subjective
report and proprioceptive drift scores on hypnotisability to test the hypothesis that
the ability to respond to suggestion in a hypnotic context is positively related to
RHI measures. Next, we report regression analyses of subjective report and
proprioceptive drift for synchronous induction on expectancies for synchronous
Table 1 Statements, questions and response labels used to generate subjective report scores for expectancies and illusion
experience.
Statement or question Response labels
E1. How strongly do you expect to feel the rubber hand is your own hand at least a little bit when the
brush strokes on your own hand and on the rubber hand are in synchrony?
3 I am certain I will feel some effect
2 I am fairly certain I will feel some effect
1 I think I will feel some effect
E2. How strongly do you expect to feel the rubber hand is your own hand at least a little bit when the
brush strokes on your own hand and on the rubber hand are not in synchrony?
0 I have no idea either way
−1 I think I won’t feel any effect
−2 I am fairly certain I won’t feel any effect
−3 I am certain I won’t feel any effect
S1. It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand
touched
3 Strongly agree
−3 Strongly disagree
S2. It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand
S3. I felt as if the rubber hand were my hand
S4 (control)The rubber hand began to resemble my own (real) hand, in terms of shape, skin tone, freckles
or some other visual feature
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induction to test the prediction that, if the RHI is a phenomenological control
effect, expectancies will positively predict illusion response. Here we present meta-
analytically combined results for synchronous induction only.
Bayes factor robustness regions for Study 2 exploratory analyses are reported as
in Study 1. Raw regression slopes were tested by Bayes factors with H1s modelled
as half-normal distributions on the expected change in y (given by mean score
across the whole sample) and the expected difference in SWASH score between 0
and the 50th percentile (a SWASH score of 1.6) as the expected change in x. A
Bayes factor for regression of subjective report on subjective SWASH score was
calculated using half the maximum slope of 4.3 (mean synchronous induction
subjective report) over 1.6, or 1.4. Similarly, a Bayes factor for regression of
proprioceptive drift on subjective SWASH score was calculated using half the
maximum slope of 1 (mean synchronous induction drift) over 1.6, or 0.3. A Bayes
factor for regressions of synchronous induction subjective report or proprioceptive
drift on expectancy rating for synchronous induction was calculated using half the
maximum slope given by the distance from the mean to bottom of scale for Y over
the distance from the mean to the bottom of scale for X: 3.8 over 4.3, or 0.4 for
subjective report and 3.8 over 3, or 0.65 for proprioceptive drift. A Bayes factor for
this analysis was therefore calculated using half this value as the SD of a half-
normal, or 0.65. All other analyses are based on the interpretation of 95% CIs. For
whole sample analyses these are meta-analytically combined. In each case, CIs are
interpreted as 95% credible intervals with a uniform prior. All analyses except
Bayes factors were calculated using JASP 0.9.2 (ref. 87). Bayes factors were
calculated using Dienesʼ Bayes factor calculator at http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/
home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are available at https://osf.io/huwxd/. All
figures have associated raw data. There are no restrictions on data availability.
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